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(EDIToR's NoTL_-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-CONTRACTOR'S

BOND-LIABILITY TO MATERIALMEN-

School District No. 28 vs. Denver Pressed Brick Company-No. 13,132Decided September 12, 1932.-Opnion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. The failure of a school board to require a bond from a contractor
making repairs on a school building, in accordance with Sec. 9514, C. L. 1921,
and Ch. 155, Laws 1923, is, at most, a tort, for which the school district,
being an involuntary corporation and a subdivision of the state, is not liable
to one who has furnished materials to the contractor.
2. The provisions of Ch. 148, Laws 1929, requiring the board to give
published notice of final settlement with the contractor, are procedural and
come into effect only in cases where bond is given by the contractor.
3. The indifference of the materialman, in failing to ascertain whether
or not a contractor's bond had been given, is equivalent to negligence and precludes recovery.-Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SCHOOLS-SCHOOL DISTRICTS-STUDENTS-TRANSPORTATION

OF-ALLOW-

ANCES FOR-Stoops vs. Hale, et al.-No. 12631-Decided September 12,

1932.-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where a statute authorized the electors, at a special election, to
provide for the transportation of children to and from school and where, pursuant to such statute, it was provided that, where transportation became unfeasible, the Board was authorized to use transportation funds to "pay the
board of the school children" and where the various parents transported their
own children to school and received compensation from the Board of Education in accordance with the prescribed mileage rates, the Directors cannot
be forced to repay to the district money so expended.
2. There is nothing in the statute preventing parents from transporting
their own children.
3. The provision of the statute that "the party employed to transport
the children of any school district shall give bond" etc. applies only when a
general employment is resorted to.

4.

The fact that some of the children attended.schools outside of the

district did not preclude their parents from drawing transportation allow-

ances. Especially is this so when it is proved that the school in the other dis'trict was closer than the school in the district that was paying the allowance,
the road to the latter school being practically impassable during much of the
school year.
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5. Payments made to the parents of children attending a private school
are not authorized, but cannot be recovered in absence of a showing that the
money was paid and so used with the knowledge and consent of the School

Board.-Judgment affirmed.
oF-DIsPUTES ADJUDGED How-Allen
vs. Bailey-No. 12881-Decided September 12, 1932.-Opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Adams.
1. It is entirely within the province of a state to pass such laws as are
necessary for the regulation of cattle and sheep ranges on the public domain.
This state function arises out of the police power.
2. The Colorado statute, providing for the separation of sheep and
cattle ranges and providing further for the means of adjudicating disputes
concerning the uses of such ranges, is valid and constitutional.
3. A statute granting injunctive relief under such circumstances is desirable. It is as wise to use the processes of the law and the powers of the
court to prevent the evil as to punish the offense of crime after it has been
committed.
4. When matters are submitted to referees without instructions, if
either of the litigants desires instructions, he should offer instructions at the
time the matters are submitted, not later.-Judgment affirmed.
PUBLIC DOMAIN-RANGES-USE

FEDERAL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIONNEGLIGENCE ASSUMPTION OF RISK -

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTCONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -

ADMISSIONS-Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. Cline-

No. 12727-Decided Sept. 12, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Appellee recovered judgment against company for injuries sustained
when he jumped from a gasoline car under orders of foreman.
2. An employee assumes only the ordinary risks of his employment
and those extraordinary risks that are fully known to him, or are obvious and
appreciated by him.
3. Contributory negligence does not bar an action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, but merely affects the amount recoverable.
4. The court erred in instructing the jury that the payment of money
to the plaintiff and taking a receipt constituted, as a matter of law, a conlusive evidence of liability.
5. The court erred in excluding evidence offered by the company in
explanation of such receipt.-Judgment reversed.

PRINCIPAL

AND

AGENT-FRAUDULENT

REPRESENTATIONS-PLEADING-

ILLITERACY AS DEFENSE TO PRINTED CONTRACT-Trujillo vs. Wichita

Farm Lighting Co.-No. 12997-Decided Sept. 12, 1932-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Alter.
1. In an action by the company to recover judgment on two promissory notes of the defendants given to plaintiff for payment under a contract
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of purchase, defendants alleged false and fraudulent representations by plaintiff's agent. Judgment on the pleadings was entered against the defendants.
2. The proper way to charge representations made by an agent is to
allege that the principal made them, and then upon trial prove that the agent
made them with the principal's knowledge, consent, or authority.
3. Where the contract expressly limits the agent's authority to make
representations and agreements not stated in the contract, and sets forth that
the agent has made no such representations or agreements, the defendants
cannot relieve themselves of liability by simply pleading such representations
in their answer.
4. Where the principal expressly limits his agent's authority in the
printed contract, and does not have actual knowledge of any false and
fraudulent representation by the agent, an illiterate person who fails to obtain
proper advice will be bound by his written obligation.-Judgmentaffirmed.
CONSTRUCTION AMBIGUITY - Henry L.
Doherty vs.
Genevieve J. Short-No. 12618-DecidedSept. 12, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Adams.
1. In an action for refund under a contract to purchase Cities Service
Stock the defendant's demurrer was overruled, and, defendant electing to
stand on his demurrer, judgment was entered accordingly.
2. The provisions in the contract that it should become automatically
cancelled if the purchaser's payments due on the first of each month were
not paid on or before the first of the following month, and that in such event
the company would refund the amount of the difference between the contract
price and the market price "of the fifteenth of the month preceding" were
clear and unequivocal.
3. The stock market bid price under said contract should be
determined as of the fifteenth of the month preceding the last day of grace.
-Judgment reversed.
CONTRACTS -

LANDLORD

AND TENANT-TENANT

HOLDING OVER-TRIAL-DIRECTED

VERDICT-MOTION BY BOTH PARTIES-ERRoR-.4..4. Wells vs. Leonard
L. Blystad-No. 13171-Decided September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
1. Where a lease was for a period slightly in excess of one year and
the rental was payable monthly in advance and after the expiration of the
term, the tenant continued his occupancy and paid rent which the landlord
accepted unconditionally, the conduct of the parties operated to extend the
lease.
2. The surrender of the premises some days subsequent to the date
when payment for a given month was due, did not absolve the tenant from
liability for the entire month.
3. The effect of motions by both parties for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the testimony was tantamount to withdrawing the case from
the consideration of the jury and submitting the issue to the court.
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4. Sustaining an objection to an inquiry made of landlord as to whether
he was claiming the tenant was holding over under the lease was not error.
-Judgment affirmed.
DEEDS-DELIVERY-EvIDENCE-Henry Hammond, Heirs at Law of Mary

Radcliff, et al, vs. Effie Hammond, as Administratrix of the Estate of
George Hammond, Deceased, and Effie Hammond-No. 12715-Decided
September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Where plaintiff, as sole heir at- law of her husband, and as
administratrix of his estate sued to set aside two deeds, purporting to convey
certain real estate but which in reality were left with deceased's notary as
his agent and over which deceased exercised control up to the time of his
death, and where the trial court found there had been no delivery of said
deeds to the grantees, and set them aside and quieted title in the plaintiff, the
assignment of error concerning rejection of testimony offered to prove
acceptance by the grantees is immaterial.
2. Depositing the deeds with agent, subject to such withdrawal, does
not constitute a delivery thereof to the grantees named therein.-Judgment
affirmed.
OFFENCES-STOLEN GooDs
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EvIDENcE-SIMILAR
NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION-REs GESTAE-CREDIBILITY OF WIT-

Bennie S. Andreen vs. The People of the State of ColoradoNo. 13117-DecidedSeptember 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
NEss-Mrs.

1.

Appellant was convicted of grand larceny, and charges that the

court erred in admitting testimony concerning certain other articles found in
her possession, and apparently stolen from the complaining witness, but not

included in the information.
2. The admission of such testimony, if error, was cured by the court's
instruction to the jury to the effect that such evidence was admitted solely
because it was part of the res gestae and for the purpose of affecting the
credibility of the witness, and that the defendant could not be convicted for
the taking of said articles.
On Application for Supresedeas.-Judgment affirmed.
DAMAGES-

TRESPASS-

RIGHT TO

DRIVE

TRESPASSING

CATTLE

FROM

CARE-Phillips vs. The City of Golden-No. 12723
-Decided September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Action in tort against the City of Golden, alleging that plaintiff's
herd of cattle, without plaintiff's knowledge, had strayed upon the land of
the city, and that the city, through its agents and employes, drove away a
portion of plaintiff's herd maliciously and by use of malicious dogs, for a
distance of many miles. Defense witnesses admitted driving the cattle from
the water-shed and from the Golden reservoir, but denied malice and other
allegations. The trial court found no evidence of malice, and dismissed the
complaint.
LANDs-DEGREE OF
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2. It was the right and duty of the city to drive plaintiff's cattle from
the source of its water supply.
3. Parties have the right to drive trespassing cattle from their own
unfenced lands, exercising that degree of care to prevent injury that would
be ordinarily observed by a prudent person.-Judgment affirmed.

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS-UNIT BASIS-SUBSTITUTION OF MATERIALS-

Platte Valley Ditch and Reservoir Company vs. H. C. Lallier Construction

Company-No. 12609-Decided September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Campbell.

1. Construction contract, including schedules and specifications in
which appeared the heading "Quantities and unit prices", construed to be a
unit basis contract and not a lump sum contract.
2. Under such a contract, the contractor may recover the extra cost
of materials different from those specified in the contract, the parties having
agreed that the substitution of materials was necessary because of physical
conditions not apparent when the contract was let.-Judgment reversed and
remanded with instructions.
ACTIONS-VARIANCE

IN

COMPLAINT

ANCE JURISDICTION-Kern vs.

AND

SUMMONS-SPECIAL

APPEAR-

Wilson et al.-No. 12722-Decided Sept.

26, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

In an action wherein plaintiff claims fraud, misrepresentation and
mutual mistake, and on his summons states "Damages for misrepresentation
and breach of contract", held to be a variance between summons and complaint.
In an action for misrepresentation, fraud and mistake, when service is
had on defendant in another state, held to be an action in personum and not
in rem, and court is without jurisdiction unless defendant waives service by
appearance.

Where defendant appears specially on motion to quash summons because
of variance between complaint and summons, this is a special appearance since
it does not go to the merits of the case, and the court is without jurisdiction.Judgment affirmed.
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